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# WORKING PAPER

**A novel method for studying policymaking:  
Policy Process Analysis (PPA) applied to the  
refugee crisis**

Abel Bojar, Anna Kyriazi, Ioana-Elena Oana, and  
Zbigniew Truchlewski

European University Institute  
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## **Abstract**

This paper introduces a comprehensive method for data collection and analysis, which systematically records and evaluates various features of policy debates across space, time, and issue areas within selected policy episodes. We apply this method to the refugee crisis, discussing advantages, challenges, and best practices. Policy Process Analysis (PPA) incorporates into a single framework the constitutive elements of such policy episodes – including actors' positions and relations, activities taking place in different policymaking arenas and at different levels of governance, which allows for theoretical and empirical synthesis on a large scale. PPA lies at the cross-roads of the methodological approaches of two distinct research fields that have developed in relative isolation from each other: the study of contentious performances and the study of policy change. Drawing from these methods, it relies on hand-coded datasets collected via the mass media to construct indicators that characterise the substantive elements of policy debates, including the participants, their positions, their interactions, their issue-emphasis, and framing strategies. This holistic reconstruction enables the large-scale, comparative study of the policy process from multiple angles at different levels of analysis, both statically and over time.

## **Keywords**

Policy Process Analysis; media data; actor coalitions; politicization; framing

## **Statements & Declarations**

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# 1. Introduction

This paper presents a new comprehensive method for data collection and analysis, called Policy Process Analysis (PPA), which systematically records and evaluates various features of policy debates across space, time, and issue areas. We illustrate the usefulness of our method by applying it to a series of policy packages and debates that various European governments put forward to come to terms with the European refugee crisis. Our PPA application to the refugee crisis demonstrates that our method captures important political dynamics such as salience, polarization, politicization, actor configurations and conflicts, by measuring them systematically, transparently, and integrated in a single dataset.

The hallmark of PPA is that it enables the comparative study of policymaking processes that take place within policy episodes. PPA incorporates into a single framework the constitutive elements of such policy episodes – including actors' positions and relations, activities taking place in different policymaking arenas and at different levels of governance, which allows for theoretical and empirical synthesis on a large scale. Who is driving politicisation in a debate? How do policy makers respond to the various forms of public contestation if and when they arise? What coalitions of actors emerge and how do they evolve over time? How do actors justify their positions? Under which conditions does a policy debate move to a meta-level, spilling-over from policy contestation to the polity itself? These are some, but by no means all, of the questions that we can pose and find answers to with the help of PPA.

PPA is a methodological innovation that captures the public face of policymaking. We define the “public face” as the subset of the policy process that plays out in front of the general public via the mass media. PPA constitutes a type of content analysis, which generates datasets based on newspaper articles at the level of analysis decided by the researcher. It consists of gathering a raw dataset via hand-coding of what actors say or do in relation to a policy proposal according to a highly detailed coding scheme, followed by the construction of aggregated indicators. These allow us to quantify various aspects of the debate, such as the level of its politicization and the intensity of the conflict. Indicators can then be used either as descriptive tools as a part of a in-depth narrative, systematic process analysis, or be subjected to statistical analysis.

PPA lies at the crossroads of two research fields: the study of contentious performances and the study of policy change, each of which have developed distinct methodologies. On the one hand, PPA shares several of the key characteristics of Political Claims Analysis (Koopmans and Statham 1999), Protest Event Analysis (PEA) (for a review, see: Hutter 2014), and Contentious Episode Analysis (CEA) (Kriesi, Hutter, and Bojar 2019). On the other hand, the object of PPA is, as its name suggests, policymaking. It is on this terrain that PPA meets other established methodologies to the study of comparative public policy. Like conventional theories of the policy cycle, PPA seeks to document the chronology of the policy process (for a review of theories of policy cycle, see: Jann and Wegrich 2007). Within this field, PPA comes closest to the Comparative Policy Agendas (CPA) project, “a large-scale comparative approach to the study of policy dynamics” (Baumgartner et al. 2006, 961). However, in contrast to legislation, which constitutes the most extensively documented component of CPA data (Baumgartner et al. 2019), PPA systematically incorporates into a single framework information about the major components of an entire policy debate across multiple institutional arenas as well as the media.

PPA focuses on *mediated* policy debates, or in other words, when policymaking enters the limelight of public scrutiny. To put this into context, we can think of the punctuated equilibrium model advanced by Baumgartner and Jones (2010): while policies can and do change incrementally in the background, major and rapid change typically occurs when “policies come to the forefront as a result of single events and major political actors begin to discuss them” (Baumgartner et al. 2006, 962). Crises, in particular, act as exceptional events that expose the failures of old paradigms and precipitate drastic change (Hall 1993). It is in such instances when the media and the public play a distinctive role (Jann and Wegrich 2007, 47), and which therefore delineate the universe of phenomena that PPA studies.

PPA takes a holistic approach to decision-making, allowing for the integration into a single framework of a wide variety of relevant factors. Crucially, it records policy-related activities that occur at different levels (national, sub-national, transnational, and supranational) and arenas (governmental, parliamentary, protest, etc.). This multidimensionality is arguably “a central feature of the policy process in modern societies” (Jann and Wegrich 2007, 56). PPA is, therefore, particularly well-placed to investigate the multi-level politics of the European Union or other compound polities like the United States etc. Furthermore, PPA allows for collecting fine-grained information which helps to capture, through detailed issue codes, variation on dimensions that are otherwise difficult to disaggregate, such as which sub-components of a policy-package are most salient or divisive.

Another distinguishing feature of PPA is the detail with which we can document not only the set of actors involved in a given debate, their activities and their relations, but also how these elements evolve over time. PPA is thus a steppingstone for more complex data analysis of coalition dynamics, such as network analysis or longitudinal statistical techniques. To illustrate the strength of this feature, we can think of the difference between conceptualizing coalitions as the sum of participants’ positions at the endpoint of some sort of negotiation or deliberation, such as roll call vote results (e.g., Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999) and the evolution of these positions over time. The latter approach is better placed to illuminate the process of how coalitions are built or dismantled and PPA is particularly well-suited for this task.

The next section provides an overview of PPA in relation to other established methods in the social sciences relying on media data. The third section discusses in detail the various features of the policy debates that PPA aims to capture. The fourth section presents examples of how the codes can be used to describe substantively meaningful aspects of policy processes with an application to the refugee crisis. The final section concludes by presenting guidelines for best practice for those interested in incorporating PPA in their methodological arsenal.

## **2. PPA: studying the public face of policymaking**

PPA builds on other established methods relying on media data, namely Political Claims Analysis (PCA), Protest Event Analysis (PEA), Contentious Episode Analysis (CEA), and Core Sentence Analysis (COSA). Drawing on insights from PCA (Koopmans and Statham 1999), PPA seeks to improve previous methods’ relatively narrow focus in data collection by expanding the empirical scope of actors, actions, arenas, issues, and frames. PPA builds on and goes beyond the challenger/government dichotomy of PEA and CEA by including a more refined set of actor types and action repertoires (Koopmans and Statham 1999; Kriesi, Hutter, and Bojar 2019; Earl et al. 2004). As a result, PPA not only offers a fine-grained analysis of actor positioning, discursive framing, coalitions, as well as their dynamics over time; it also allows for a comparative study of policy episodes with a standardized data collection method. The remainder of this section develops these points.



First and foremost, PPA explicitly recognises the multifaceted nature of political conflict without restricting data collection and analysis towards a single, particular class of events. A case in point is Protest Event Analysis (PEA), an influential method originating in the 1960s to study contentious politics and violence (Shorter and Tilly 1974; Hutter 2014; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975). Subsequently, PEA became a type of content analysis using text as data (Krippendorff 2004) transforming the qualitative information enclosed in the text into quantitative, typically count-based variables (Franzosi 2004) in order to analyse political conflict in a comparative manner. However, because PEA analyses events which are *a priori* known and visible, PEA is limited in its focus on a single type of outcome variable and its selection strategy of the contexts under study (one is likely to omit parts of or entire policy debates where major collective mobilization did not occur). In the words of some scholars, PEA (by definition) is too protest-centric because it only focuses on people in the street, rather than their discourse (Koopmans and Statham 1999). PPA seeks to go beyond the scope of protests, and it aims to cover all the policy episode by extending data collection to other arenas and action types. More specifically, PPA seeks to illuminate how public discourse is an alternative channel of social conflict and a locus of symbolic struggles (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Donati 1992). Essentially, therefore, it pushes forward the research agenda initiated by Political Claims Analysis (PCA) (Koopmans and Statham 1999) to expand the notion of physical protest to the discursive domain and to treat claims-making as an equally important aspect of political conflict.

Secondly, PPA seeks to broaden the scope of existing methods in terms of the actors that constitute the object of analysis. While PEA and Core Sentence Analysis of electoral campaigns (COSA; see Kriesi et al. 2008, Kriesi et al. 2012, Hutter and Kriesi 2019 for well-known applications) are inherently limited in their actor scope by focusing on actors with a capacity to mobilize crowds in the streets and political parties, respectively, other methods such as PCA and Contentious Episodes Analysis (CEA) have a broader scope by including actors that are confined to routine, institutional arenas of policymaking, such as business organisations, regulatory agencies, and courts. However, by organising data collection around a government-challenger dichotomy – with third parties included as a residual actor type in the case of CEA – these methods are also limited in capturing actions by actors that do not neatly fit in any of these stylized categories. PPA seeks to overcome this limitation by coding actors solely based on their institutional characteristics whilst remaining *a priori* agnostic on their structural role in the conflict. Consequently, the resulting PPA datasets, as we shall illustrate later on in this article, include information on more than 100 different actor types that may or may not oppose governments at various stages of the policy debate. This also offers a solution to the dilemma acknowledged by the authors of CEA (Bojar et al, 2021: 13): actors' position vis a vis government proposals can and do change throughout the conflict, therefore any government-challenger-(third party) dichotomy (trichotomy) is poised to be ridden with identification problems and ambiguities.

As a solution, PPA codes all sorts of actors that a researcher may be interested in without limiting them to a stylized dichotomy or trichotomy. PPA thus allows to reconstruct coalitions of all potential actors including not just the ones we think are *a priori* relevant. New and unexpected actors might emerge which would be unobserved confounders in the CEA framework. Such confounders can influence the power constellations that serve as a springboard for challengers and governments and which impact the decision to escalate or de-escalate contention. An example of such an unobserved confounding actor could be an independent state institution which is not a part of the government, in *sensu stricto*, nor does it fit neatly in the third party category.

A third aspect in which PPA broadens the scope of analysis is its explicit conceptualization of policy debates occurring on multiple levels of policymaking. In this sense, PPA addresses recurring concerns on the “methodological nationalism” of many existing methods and social sciences in general (see Chernilo, 2006 for a complete genealogy of this critique). PPA is a highly flexible tool that is able to capture policy-debates unfolding on these different levels – such as the EU-level, the national level, and possibly also on the sub-national level. Moreover, on any given level, the coding scheme of PPA allows for cross-level interactions in the debate by explicitly coding the level and

the corresponding policymaking arenas in which any particular action occurs (see next section for more details). Accordingly, PPA allows researchers to analyse to what extent and what aspects of a given policy-debate become internationalized or remain confined within national boundaries, or alternatively, how the key actors strategically choose different arenas to escalate conflict or to build coalitions.

The broader scope of analysis that PPA offers also goes a long way in mitigating a vexing issue that has long haunted scholars relying on media data: selection bias (Earl et al. 2004; Ortiz et al. 2005). Though a degree of bias resulting from differential newsworthiness of the various actions in the policy debate is inevitable in any method relying on media data, the broader scope of coding offered by PPA limits its severity. By focusing on only a narrow group of actors, such as the ones able to launch collective mobilization (PEA), or political parties (COSA), existing methods put forward coding schemes that capture only a subset of the policy-debate, by design. While this may be advantageous if a researcher seeks to analyse only that subset for a well-founded reason, it may be highly problematic if findings from that subset are stretched and generalized in an attempt to characterise the entire policy-debate, or to infer the major lines of conflict in a society. PPA, instead, has the explicit ambition to characterise policy-debates holistically and as a result, it seeks to limit selection bias of news sources at the stage of news selection (see more details in the concluding section).

This holistic reconstruction of policy-debates also allows to trace preference formation by actors as a policy episode unfolds, as opposed to measuring preferences only for a whole contentious episode at the end of a political process (such as votes in the European Council in the EMU Positions database (Wasserfallen et al. 2019) or in single institutional arenas, such as the parliamentary arena in the Comparative Agendas Project (Baumgartner et al, 2019)). As a result, the researcher is able to pinpoint how and when actor positions change, when coalitions are formed or dismantled, and in which issue areas or sub-debates there is the highest potential for conflict or compromise. In other words, PPA offers a major improvement over some of the existing methods inasmuch as it allows for a dynamic conceptualization and operationalization of actor coalitions over a relatively extended period of time as opposed to particular time points, such as election campaigns or legislative sessions in parliaments.

Beyond the broader scope of the coding and its concomitant advantages, another key feature of PPA is that it retains the strength of the “middle-ground” introduced to the study of political conflict by CEA (Kriesi et al, 2019; Bojar et al, 2021). On the one hand, these middle-ground approaches borrow from the Dynamics of Contention tradition (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; McAdam and Tarrow 2011; George and Bennett 2005) by focusing on mechanisms and processes of contention beyond single case studies and applying structured case comparisons to evaluate theoretically identified mechanisms that drive contention. In this narrative approach, the key ingredient that PPA offers is the so-called “action strings” that provide a concise summary of each action in a way that allows for a complete reconstruction of the policy-debate. Such reconstruction of the debate is a useful tool for qualitative-minded researchers in the process-tracing tradition who can use these action strings to document different types of actions (such as formal steps in the policymaking process) as they unfold over time in a systematic fashion as well as to identify key actions that may serve as turning points or critical junctures in the broader policy debate.

On the other hand, the PPA codes allow researchers to leverage the other strength of the “middle-ground”: the construction of quantitative indicators that allow for cross-case inferences and longitudinal analysis in a rigorous statistical framework. As we shall show via examples in Section 4, such indicators include but are not restricted to actor-specific policy-positions, episode- and actor-specific politicization and episode- and actor-specific conflict intensity of the policy-debate.

Once the indicators are defined and calculated, standard cross-sectional and longitudinal – time-series and time-series-cross-section – techniques are available subject to some of the well-known nuisances of these techniques, such as unbalanced panels, missing data/time-periods, and possible measurement error resulting from differential coverage of events in different countries and policy episodes.

In short, PPA builds on existing methods of data collection and analysis in the social sciences that rely on media data in general, and Protest Event Analysis, Political Claims Analysis, Core Sentence Analysis of election campaigns and Contentious Episodes Analysis in particular. It also offers improvement to some of their shortcomings, such as the scope of actions and actors under analysis, selection biases, explicit identification of different levels of policymaking, and a flexible “middle-ground” solution to simultaneously offer a systematic tool to researchers in the process-tracing tradition and to allow for the construction of quantitative indicators and rigorous statistical analysis. In the following two sections, we outline the general PPA framework in detail followed by particular applications of the method in the context of a highly salient policy-area: the European refugee crisis.

### 3. PPA in practice: the general framework

Setting up the coding process consists of a few important steps familiar from other data collection methods that rely on media data. First, researchers have to define their empirical universe, which is ideally a bounded segment of the policy debate unfolding in various issue domains. This bounded segment can be a whole crisis period, such as the European response to Covid-19 or the various stages of the Brexit negotiations, or it can alternatively take the form of distinct policy episodes embedded in broader crisis periods, such as the policy debate revolving around the EU-Turkey agreement in the context of the 2013-2020 refugee crisis. Once the empirical scope of the data collection is defined, researchers need to choose their news sources from the international or the national press, depending on the level of the policymaking they want to analyse. We encourage the use of news aggregator platforms, such as Factiva or LexisNexis, as they provide access to a large number of media outlets allowing for systematic multi-country studies and transparent and replicable selection criteria on the source. An additional advantage of such news aggregators is that they allow for complex search strings using Boolean algebra and its standard logical operators. In the concluding section of this article, we offer more detailed guidelines on best practices that address source and keyword selection, among other considerations.

Before we outline the variables (or characteristics of the policy debate) that PPA aims to capture, it is imperative to define the most basic building block of our method. While the datasets compiled via PPA may be structured according to different logics— e.g., by sectoral crises, by policy episodes, by time periods, by geographical levels of analysis – the common denominator underpinning all these logics is the smallest level of observation: an action. We define an action as *an act, or a claim by an actor with a prominent role in the political world that has a direct or indirect relevance for the policy debate*. The definition is deliberately broad and open-ended because what constitutes a theoretically interesting part of the debate is highly contingent on the specificities of the actual policy-debate and on the underlying research question. For instance, a statement by a professional organisation, such as a medical body, carries very different political relevance in the context of a public health emergency, like the Covid-19 pandemic, compared to other sectoral crises, like a refugee crisis or a banking crisis. Crisis-specific considerations thus simultaneously dictate the design of the codebook and the choices that coders will have to make on whether a candidate for an action they encounter in the media should be coded or not.

PPA aims to capture the following characteristics of the action that we elaborate on below: arena where it takes place, its (procedural) form, its (substantive) type of engagement with the policy, its overall direction vis-a-vis the policy, its direction vis-a-vis target actors, the organisational characteristics of the actor undertaking them, the organisational characteristics of the target actor, the issues it engages with, and the normative frames used by actors to present their positions to the public.

The first characteristic that PPA aims to capture is the arena where the action takes place. One of the greatest advantages of our approach is its high degree of flexibility in capturing policy-processes across vastly different issue domains. An important condition for such flexibility, however, is that the method needs to allow for a broad set of institutional and extra-institutional arenas where the policy-debate may unfold. This sets PPA apart from some of the other approaches we have discussed above, such as PEA and COSA where, by construction, the arenas are defined and restricted prior to data collection. PPA, by contrast, makes the arena choice where actors operate an integral part of the empirical exercise. The importance of policymaking arenas was already recognised by Lowi and Nicholson in their seminal contribution “Arenas of Power” (Lowi and Nicholson 2009) where they argued that as a function of the degree and type of coercion that authorities are able to exercise, different type of policies and politics are likely to emerge. In the multilevel-politics of the European Union (Hooghe and Marks 2001) arena choice is an even more important aspect of the policy-debate because it fundamentally shapes the type of actors that gain access to policymaking, the size and type of audiences that participants can address, and the type of policy options on the table as a function of the gate-keeping role of agenda setters (Princen 2011).

Once the arena of the action has been identified, PPA codes the specific form of the action. The type of action form, however, is contingent on the underlying arena. The PPA codebook thus needs to specify the forms of action that can occur in the respective arenas, striking a balance between exhaustiveness and parsimony. In certain arenas, the specific set of action forms can be based upon long-standing traditions in the pertinent literature, such as the set of action repertoires in the protest arena (Traugott 1995; Della Porta 2013). In other arenas, such as the media arena, the set of action forms needs to be established inductively by the designers of the PPA codebook and occasionally updated when novel and unexpected action forms come up during the coding process. It is important to note here that the arena-action form code is analogous to the use of procedural action form by CEA. However, PPA offers an important improvement on CEA in the way the action forms are arena-specific and, therefore, able to describe the actions at a much greater precision.

While the arena and action form codes mostly provide answers to the “where and the how”, the next pair of codes that PPA assigns to the action aims to answer the “what”. Similar in spirit to the substantive action codes that Bojar et al. (forthcoming) applied in their analysis of 60 contentious episodes in the context of the Great Recession, PPA proposes a wide set of policy action codes. Again, PPA seeks to improve on the CEA codebook by allowing for a wider set of action repertoire, distinguishing between policy claims, policymaking steps and administrative actions. Similar to the arena–action form pair, the policy action codes consist of two levels with the first level identifying the broad type of action – such as a formal step in the policymaking process – while the second, specific level identifies the particular action with regards to the policy – for instance, an amendment or a veto. The logic of the code is again hierarchical: depending on the broad type of action assigned on the first level, there is a different set of specific action types available on the second level.

Implicit in the assignment of the appropriate code for the policy action codes is a general understanding by the coder whether the action implies a broad level of agreement or disagreement with the underlying policy on the table. This broad level of agreement or disagreement is captured under the policy direction code. This highly succinct summary of the actor's position on the issue is a core feature of PPA datasets and its logic is borrowed from COSA and its application for election campaigns (see Hutter and Kriesi 2019 for a recent example). The (dis)agreement with the policy issue can be either explicitly stated by the article (via a direct quote by the actor undertaking the action, for example) or it can be inferred from the formulation of the journalist herself. Alternatively, the action may have important relevance for the policy debate yet it may be fully ambiguous on where the actor stands on the issue. Such ambiguity can arise from mixed signals ("on the one hand, on the other hand" type of policy claims), or just from the actor's failure to express any policy position whatsoever (for instance, an actor can ask for clarification without any reference to their own preferences).

Conceptually distinct from the policy direction code, PPA also identifies how the actor relates to other actor(s) in the policy debate. Not all actions have such "target actors" and it is important to make a conceptual distinction between actions that only speak to an issue and those that also address a target actor. We call this latter type of action a dyadic action. For such dyadic actions, PPA also assigns an actor direction code in addition to the policy direction code. The actor direction code captures the actor's relational attitude vis-à-vis the target actor regardless of how she relates to the policy as such. A positive actor direction code can take the form of explicit verbal support of the target actor or an action that helps the target (via increasing the latter's capacity to act, for instance). Conversely, a negative actor direction code can take the form of an explicit criticism of the target or an action that imposes a cost on the target (for instance, by withdrawing resources from it). An important distinction between the two direction codes is that while every action needs to have a policy direction code (all coded actions, by definition, need to have a policy content), only a subset of the actions (the dyadic part) needs to have an actor direction code.

Perhaps the most complex part of the coding exercise is coding the actors themselves. Actors can be characterised by their nationalities, broad institutional affiliations (such as the national government), narrow institutional affiliation (a particular ministry) and if it is an individual, rather than a collective actor, her position within the institution's hierarchy. In case of dyadic actions, two set of actor codes need to be filled out: one for the actor undertaking the action (initiator) and one for the target. In the extreme when an individual actor is targeting another individual actor, no less than eight codes are necessary to fully describe the actor-actor relationship: four for the initiator, four for the target. The coder needs to take special care that for every dyadic action there needs to be also a corresponding actor direction code (and vice versa, for each actor direction code, the set of target actor codes needs to be filled out).

The next set of codes identifies the particular issue area that the action relates to. In the case of policy episodes, this issue area is typically a part of the policy package under discussion. For instance, in the case of multi-dimensional reform packages or complex austerity measures, the issue area can identify one of the reform items (e.g., retirement age). When the coding is applied for broader crisis processes, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, the issue code identifies the particular policy area under discussion (e.g., school closures). Depending on the organising logic of the coding, the issue area has varying importance. When PPA is applied for broader crisis processes, the issue codes are crucial because they serve as the conceptual anchor for all the codes. In other words, they designate what some of the other codes, such as the policy direction code and the policy action code, refer to. When PPA is applied for particular policy episodes, the policy as such is the conceptual anchor and the issue codes merely serve to provide additional detail on the action. In either case, to allow for multiple issue areas that an actor may touch upon in her action, we recommend researchers to operate with at least two (but possibly more) issue codes.

The final set of codes that PPA aims to identify is the narrative frames actors use to justify their actions or claims. Framing has long been recognised as an essential part of political communication and as such, it has a great potential to affect public opinion (see Chong and Druckman 2007 for a review). Actors' discursive strategies are likely, therefore, to coalesce around certain types of frames depending on the political objectives of the actors. Moreover, identifying the narrative frames can also serve as an important complement to mapping out coalition dynamics (see next section). To the extent that coalition partners use (dis)similar frames on certain issues, it may provide important cues to the proximity of their policy preferences and by extension, the expected duration of their coalition.

While some of the frames are relatively straightforward to code, others may be sensitive to coder-specific interpretations. Moreover, the set of possible frames that coders can choose from is highly contingent on the underlying political process that PPA is applied for. Very different frames are likely to emerge when coding refugee policies (such as identitarian frames or security frames) compared to coding the Covid-19 response where other frames, such as public health and economic ones, are likely to be more prevalent. It is thus essential that researchers develop a basic level of inductive understanding of the policy field before they prescribe the set of frame codes that they wish to operate with.

The coding scheme we have outlined thus far consists of a set of categorical variables where the categories are set by the researchers prior to the coding so that coders need only to choose one of the categories that they deem the most appropriate to describe the action at hand. Often, this means they will need to approximate the characteristics of the action as any list the researcher prescribes will be inevitably incomplete and limited to cater for all possibilities in an inherently complex political world. The aim is to strike a reasonable balance between parsimony and precision so that the resulting dataset can provide a good approximation of the various characteristics of the debate and for the more quantitative minded researcher, to render the dataset amenable to rigorous statistical analysis.

That said, in order to fill in the gaps left open by these limitations, PPA complements the dataset by a set of "open-ended" codes where coders can provide more qualitative information on the action. Most importantly, we propose an action string variable that the coder can use to provide a verbal summary of the action. This summary can take the form of a copy-pasted segment of the news article. Moreover, recognizing the difficulties that coding the frames is likely to give rise to, we also propose a frame string variable where the coder can illustrate the specific verbal formulation that the actors use in their rhetoric. These verbal formulations often take the form of a catchy metaphor which illustrates the frame that the coder has already identified.

We summarize our coding scheme in *Table 1* below.

**Table 1. Summary of the variables used by PPA**

Question	Variable	Examples across issue domains
Where/how?	Arena, action form	Parliament – plenary debate Media – public speech
What?	Policy action code (general, specific)	Policy claims – Full (verbal) support for policy Policy steps – Appeals against policy to higher authorities
What?	Policy direction code, actor direction code	Positive
Who?	Actor (country, broad organisation, narrow organisation, position, name)	(Germany – National government – Ministry of Health – Executive – Jens Spahn)
To whom?	Target actor (country, broad organisation, narrow organisation, position, name)	(EU – EU Institutions – EU Commission – Sub-executive – Frans Timmermans)
In relation to what?	Issue	Closing borders to travellers Civic integration courses to asylum seekers
Why?	Frames, frame string	Security Public Health
Multiple questions	Action string	In an interview with "Die Welt" Vice-chairman of the SPD, Ralf Stegner, stated that the SPD is with chancellor Merkel in her assessment that 'we can do it' (Wir schaffen das)

Having laid out the basic framework of PPA, we now present empirical applications based on a dataset we have compiled on the policy responses to the refugee crisis in eight European countries. For full details of the dataset – codebook and descriptive tabulations – we refer the reader to the Appendix.

## 4. PPA in action: the 2013-2020 refugee crisis

We put PPA to the test in the context of five crisis processes that the EU and its member states have experienced over the past decade: the Eurozone crisis, the social crisis, Brexit (membership/polity-crisis), the refugee crisis, and the Covid-19 pandemic. For each crisis, we apply PPA on two levels of the policy debate: the national (member state) level and the EU-level. In this section, we illustrate our PPA methodology with the dataset we have compiled for the refugee crisis at the member states level.

PPA brings distinctive advantages to the study of the refugee crisis. First, its *broad empirical scope* enables a focus on a wide variety of actions and actors to systematically reconstruct the various policy debates. In doing so, the data allows for direct comparisons across specific issues, arenas, actor categories, at the EU level and at the level of the member states. Second, by aiming at the *middle ground between quantitative and qualitative* approaches, PPA combines systematic, comparative indicators with the reconstruction of the narrative chronology of policy debates by the use of a rich body of qualitative evidence. Third, PPA brings in a relational focus by studying how actors relate to one another and how these relationships can shift over time.

For this coding exercise, we bounded our analysis at the level of a policy episode which comprises the policy debate in the wake of a specific policy proposal that governments put forward to come to terms with the refugee crisis during the period 2013-2020. We first identified five\* key policy episodes (see *Table 3* below) in eight countries that played a prominent role in the refugee crisis, either because of their geographical/structural position in the crisis or because of their distinct role in the EU-level policy debate: Greece, Italy (frontline states), Hungary, Austria (transit states), and Germany, Sweden, France, and UK (destination states) (see Kriesi et al. forthcoming for more details on country selection for this analysis). Some of the policies we have chosen are legislative acts, such as reforms to the countries' asylum systems, others are administrative decisions and novel practices by state institutions, such as the re-imposition of border controls, while still others are fluid and better characterised as a series of ad-hoc decisions or non-decisions by the government in a heightened period of problem pressure, such as the summer of 2015 period in Greece. *Table 2* summarises the episodes we have coded via the short labels we assigned to them.

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\* In the case of the UK, we coded six episodes because of difficulties in selecting the five most important ones.



**Table 2. National-level policy episodes in the refugee crisis**

Country	Episode I	Episode II	Episode III	Episode IV	Episode V	Episode VI
Austria	Border controls	Balkan Route closure	Asylum Law	Integration Law	Right to intervene	
France	Ventimiglia	Border controls	Asylum Law	Rights of Foreigners	Calais	
Germany	“Wir Schaffen Das”	Asylum Package	Integration Law	Deportation	CDU-CSU conflict	
Greece	Summer of 2015	Hotspots-Frontex	International Protection Bill	Turkey border conflict	Detention Centres	
Hungary	Fence building	Quota referendum	Legal border barrier amendment	Civil Law	“Stop Soros”	
Italy	Mare Nostrum	Ventimiglia	Brenner Pass	Port Closures	Sicurezza bis	
Sweden	Border control	Residence permits	Police powers	Family reunification	Municipalities	
UK	Immigration Act (2014)	Immigration Act (2016)	Dubs Amendment	Vulnerable Persons’ Resettlement Scheme	Calais	Modern Slavery Act


In total, our team has identified 6425 codable actions for the 41 episodes, yielding 157 actions per episode on average. However, there is considerable variation in how eventful the individual episodes are, ranging from 48 actions in the Residence Permits episode in Sweden to 363 actions during the Quota referendum in Hungary. In fact, Hungary has proven to be the most eventful of our eight countries with 1204 actions followed by Greece with 1086 actions. On the other end of the spectrum, our Swedish coder has registered a mere 473 actions for the five Swedish episodes.

While we relegate the full descriptive details of our database to the Appendix, we offer three illustrations for how the data can be used for an empirical analysis of the refugee crisis. The three illustrations are based on three different levels of data aggregation, proceeding from the general to the specific. We begin with an illustration that is based on the crisis as a whole, taking the entire dataset as the empirical base. Secondly, we zoom in on the most eventful country of our sample, Hungary, and propose a parsimonious tool to identify coalition dynamics across the five Hungarian episodes. Thirdly, we further zoom in on one of the most contentious episodes in the Hungarian case, the erection of the southern border fence and the subsequent debates on border control throughout the years 2015-2016.

We begin with an illustration of the crisis as a whole. One pertinent question relates to the clash between legitimizing narratives by the different proponents and opponents of the policy responses to the refugee crisis. On one end of the spectrum, one encounters the securitizing narrative on migration (Bourbeau 2011; Karamanidou 2015) that aims to present the crisis as a vital threat to the EU’s and its member states’ physical security. On the other end, public discourse is also heavily influenced by humanitarian frames (Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017) that aim to present the crisis as first and foremost a humanitarian concern. Between these two dominant ideal types of frames,

however, we identified eight additional frames that appeared in the debates: sovereignty, geopolitical, identitarian, democracy/rule of law, international solidarity, domestic solidarity, economic-utilitarian, and efficiency/pragmatic frames. On *Figure 1*, we illustrate the relative frequency of these frames via a heatmap, broken down by the broad type of actors utilizing them. In particular, we distinguish between 11 broad actor types, aggregated from the more detailed actor codes as presented in *Table A-2* in the Appendix. The aggregated actor categories are: EU actors, foreign governments, other supranational actors (e.g., UN, IMF), national government, local and regional authorities, other state institutions, senior government parties, junior government parties, mainstream opposition parties, radical challenger opposition parties, and civil society actors.

**Figure 1. The use of frames by actor categories in the refugee crisis (column percentages)**



*Figure 1* shows that there are indeed distinct discursive strategies employed by the various actors. National governments (and their parliamentary wings) come closest to the securitization perspective, while civil society actors and to a lesser extent, mainstream opposition parties tend to resort to humanitarian frames the most. International actors, by contrast, most commonly appeal to international solidarity considerations. This is particularly the case among EU officials and foreign governments who led the push towards international burden sharing as a part of the management of the refugee crisis in the EU. Another interesting pattern that emerges is that most actor types often employed the efficiency/pragmatic frames in their rhetoric. These frames were usually used when participants in the debate tried to justify their position by “what works” (or what doesn’t) rather than taking a strong principled stance on the issue.

In addition to the frames commonly employed, it is also noteworthy that some of the likely candidates turned out to be quite marginal in the debate. Most importantly, identitarian frames, such as attempts to depict the crisis as a clash of civilizations between Christian Europe and Islam, featured rarely in the discourses with the partial exception of government parties (mostly driven by Fidesz officials’ statements in Hungary). Likewise, economic-utilitarian frames, a crucial dimension in migration-related debates in general (Drinkwater et al. 2003; Constant and Zimmerman 2013),

appeared just over 5% among all frames used across the eight countries. In sum, we can confirm via this brief overview that security and humanitarian frames are indeed among the most commonly used frame types in the debates surrounding the refugee crisis along with pragmatic justifications on the merits of the different policy responses.

While frames are informative as far as the discursive dimension of the crisis is concerned, PPA also allows us to pin down positional coalitions. For this purpose, we resort to the direction codes (policy direction and actor direction) as well as the policy action codes that provide more details on the particular type of support/opposition to the policies. We derive a weighted support measure ranging between 1 and -1 with 1 standing for actions with strong support for the policy, 0.5 weaker forms of support, 0 a neutral stance, -0.5 weaker forms of opposition and -1 strong opposition. Averaging this weighted support measure over the episodes, we can provide a comparative snapshot on the coalitions that emerged across different episodes in Hungary.

**Table 3. Coalition dynamics across the Hungarian episodes (average weighted support measure by broad actor types)\***

Actor types	Episodes				
	Fence Building	Quota Referendum	Legal border barrier amendment	Civil Law	“Stop Soros”
EU	0.00	-0.52	-0.50	-0.63	-0.61
other governments	-0.47	0.14		-0.88	-0.80
other supranational	-0.63	-1.00	-0.64	-0.70	-0.71
national govt	0.88	0.97	1.00	0.87	0.79
local-reg govt	0.83	0.82			-1.00
other nat	1.00	0.75	1.00	0.64	0.19
gov party-senior	0.89	0.91	1.00	1.00	0.75
gov party-junior	1.00	0.96	1.00	0.93	0.50
mainstream opp	-0.70	-0.83	-1.00	-0.83	-0.78
populist opp	0.14	0.09	-1.00	-0.50	-0.08
Civil society	-0.13	0.42	-0.40	-0.60	-0.75

\*Dark shaded area refers to the supporting coalitions. Light shaded areas refer to the opposing coalition. Missing entries indicate no action by the given actor type in the given episode. We placed actors in one of the coalitions whenever their average direction score is either greater than 0.5 or lower than -0.5.


The coalition patterns show some common patterns across the episodes but also some important differences. Unsurprisingly, the national government forms a stable coalition with the government parties (Fidesz and KDNP in the Hungarian context), occasionally complemented by state institutions and local and regional authorities. On the opposing end, the mainstream opposition forms a counter-coalition with non-EU supranational institutions (such as the UN) and occasionally with the EU (in three of the five episodes), other governments (in two of the five episodes), civil society actors (two of the five episodes), and the radical challenger opposition, Jobbik (two of the five episodes). Tracing these coalition patterns from one episode to the next, there is a clear swing from a pro-coalition dominance (first two episodes) to more of a fight among equals (last three episodes). In particular, while in the first two episodes the mainstream opposition is only aided by non-EU supranational institutions, in the other three episodes they get support from a combination of EU level actors, other governments, radical challengers, civil society, and local and regional authorities.

This simple exercise provides some interesting insights into coalition patterns in Hungary during the refugee crisis both in a static and in a dynamic sense. From the former perspective, the average position scores indicate that the actors stood on the main issues a world apart with the protagonists' average policy direction score spanning almost the entire range of the policy direction score indicator (-1 to 1). The policy debate can thus be characterised as highly polarised. From a dynamic perspective, this exercise sheds light on the fluidity of coalition dynamics, underscoring the need to think of coalitions as highly contingent on the particular policy episodes under study rather than being stable over crisis processes as a whole.

Among the Hungarian episodes included in our data, the first episode, labelled as "Fence Building", was the most complex and multi-faceted one. It includes the amendment of the Asylum Law in the summer of 2015, the construction of the fence at the Serbian border over the summer and its extension to the Croatian border in the autumn, the setting up of transit zones for asylum seekers near the border, the tightening of penal code for offenses related to illegal crossings and physical damages to the fence in September 2015, and the imposition of the 8 kilometres rule allowing for the detention of asylum seekers in the summer of 2016.

In our last empirical illustration of our method, we aim to answer the following question: to what extent was the Fence Building episode politicized and who were the actors responsible for its politicization? To do so, we rely on the idea of politicization being the product of salience and polarisation (Hutter and Grande 2014). We measure salience\*\* by the number of actions occurring in the episode in a given month and we measure polarisation as the share of supporting times the share of opposing actions in a given a month\*\*\*. We apply the same formula for each episode, and we standardize the resulting products to rescale the variable between 0 and 1 (1 corresponding to the most politicized episode-month) in our dataset. In the illustration below, we present the actor-specific politicization measures which allows us to understand not just the degree of politicization in a given month but also the actors driving it.

**Figure 2. Actor-specific politicization in the "Fence Building" episode in Hungary**



\*\* As a minor modification to a simple count measure for salience, we weigh the monthly action counts by the different length of the reporting newspapers to allow for the possibility that in some countries, systematically fewer/more actions are reported by their press outlets.

\*\*\* We multiply this product by four to rescale the variable between 0 and 1.

This simple visualisation of politicization during the Fence Building episode allows us to draw a couple of conclusions. First, the episode conforms well to the idea of “punctuated politicization” (Grande and Kriesi 2016) with periods of high politicization alternating with periods of calm. One such period of heightened politicization occurred in the autumn of 2015 when refugees en route to Germany overwhelmed the Hungarian state’s capacity to address the migration pressure in an orderly fashion. After significantly lower levels of politicization in the winter and spring of 2016, a second peak occurs in the summer of 2016 with debates surrounding border reinforcement, technological upgrades, and the new detention rules for illegal border-crossers.

Another interesting angle concerns the drivers of politicization. In the autumn peak, the national government was clearly in the driver seat, resulting in one of the highest levels of politicization in October 2015 among all the episode-actor-months in our database. In the second peak, by contrast, international actors and national state- and regional authorities played a more prominent role in the debate. Moreover, the role of national opposition also changed significantly over the course of the episode. While they contributed to the autumn peak 2015 to a significant extent, they were practically absent from the summer 2016 debate.

## 5. Recommendations for good practice and limitations

In this paper we introduced a new comprehensive method for the data collection and analysis of policymaking debates: Policy Process Analysis (PPA). PPA allows for capturing the public face of policymaking, that is the subset of actions in a policymaking process that are presented to the general public through the mass-media. The method relies on analysing media data through hand-coding of the actors involved in the debate, the forms of action they engage in, their position in the debate, the arena where the actions take place, the issues addressed, and the frames used to address these issues. The resulting dataset allows for the construction of indicators at different levels of analysis (at the episode level, the actor level, at different time units) for studying the policymaking debate from multiple angles, both statically and over time. In this concluding section we focus on general recommendations for good practice in conducting high-quality PPA, including ways of mitigating some of the method’s limitations.

Firstly, as detailed in Section 3, one of the first and most consequential steps in PPA is defining the empirical universe for the data collection. This refers to the process of identifying a bounded segment of the policy debate which essentially consists of identifying clear and transparent rules related to the *boundedness of the episodes* included in the analysis, but also to the *boundedness of the actions* coded. *The boundedness of the episodes* refers to the limits of the policy debates, following temporal-based criteria, issue-based criteria, geographical-based criteria, or a combination of all three. In practice, the limits of the episodes are set by the selection of the timeframe and keywords used for constructing the initial media corpus. An iterative process of back-and-forth between the coders’ expertise, keywords, the timeline, and the corpus is essential at this stage. On the one hand, it helps to find a balance between an encompassing search that yields a large number of false positives and a restrictive one that yields too many false negatives. On the other hand, it helps to avoid missing the start and the end of a relevant debate by looking at the periods when the number of actions peaks or begins to peter out. *The boundedness of the action* refers to the definition of what constitutes a relevant action and can be used as another way of restricting the codable corpus. For example, one might decide that actions undertaken by individual citizens or small local actors at the country level are irrelevant for the wider EU-level policy debate and, consequently, can be excluded from the coding process. In practice, the reliability of the text corpus comes down to the transparency of the coding rules, to the communication of these rules to the coders with enough time and resources allocated to continuous training and supervision, and to conducting at least some form of test of the agreement between coders (such as inter-coder reliability) before proceeding to the wider data collection.

Secondly, the issue of scope conditions is also related to settling the unit of observation and unit of analysis for the study. While the smallest unit of observation consists of an action as defined above, PPA is not limited to only one unit of analysis. At the highest level of aggregation, one can draw conclusions for a policy episode, or even for a crisis process as a whole, via such indicators as politicization, conflict intensity, average actor positions, or shares of frame types. At lower levels of aggregation, one can build indicators at the level of particular actors, arenas, or time units, ending up with longitudinal datasets. An important consideration at this stage is that all of these indicators are heavily reliant on the coding categories chosen for the codebook. In practice, a pilot study on a subset of the policy episodes should be conducted using an initial codebook with theoretically informed categories. Based on the experience with this pilot study, the codebook can then be extended in the second stage with an eye on what had been missing (or what turned out to be redundant for that matter) from the first iteration. Ideally, of course, researchers should allow for as much flexibility as possible throughout the coding process in order to accommodate new categories that might have been overlooked at the stage of codebook design.

Our last set of recommendations for good practice relate to working with media data, an issue not specific only to PPA, but also to its “sister” methods, such as PEA or CEA. Scholarship on these other methods has long been preoccupied with the biases associated with news source selection and their coverage of debates, actions or events, that is, selection bias (e.g., Earl et al. 2004; Ortiz et al. 2005). While we acknowledge that the issue of selection bias cannot be fully mitigated, we do offer some ways forward in identifying, understanding, and limiting it within PPA.

Regarding newsworthiness and proximity, inevitably, any type of news source selection will result in covering only that share of actions in a policy debate that are considered of interest for the audience of the specific media outlet. Therefore, actions that take place behind closed doors or less newsworthy actions are likely unreported, but also likely to fall outside the scope of PPA as a data collection method for the public face of policy debates. If one is interested in such actions that do not make it into the media for gaining a more in-depth picture of the phenomenon studied, we suggest triangulating PPA with other data collection methods that are more likely to gain insights on less mediated developments in an episode, such as interviews with the key participants. Triangulating between PPA and such methods not only helps gain complementary insights about potentially overlooked actions, but it can also be used as a means of enhancing the validity of the PPA data by further cross-checking the accuracy of the results.

That said, one should also be acutely aware of those actions that do fall within the empirical universe of mediated actions, but are still left unreported in the selected media outlet. In order to mitigate this bias, we suggest selecting as wide a variety of news sources as possible with particular attention being paid to the level at which the analysis is conducted. This essentially refers to selecting news sources that are as proximate to the phenomenon under study as possible: for international debates, we recommend a focus on large new agencies, for national debates on national media, for regional and local events on local and regional newspapers. Additionally, the political or corporate motives of the various sources and their potential impact on news coverage should also be considered by choosing sources that are on different sides of the political spectrum.

All in all, the method we introduced in this paper comes with a series of innovations that allow to systematically examine policymaking activities and debates in a comparative fashion across time, space, and issue-areas and at various levels of analysis. Nevertheless, PPA comes with a set of limitations related on the one hand, to its reliance on the hand-coding of media data which might induce both coding imprecisions, errors, and selection biases, and on the other hand, to its labour and cost intensity. In the preceding paragraphs we aimed to offer a series of recommendations of good practice to mitigate some of the first issues. Further developments could engage more thoroughly with issues of robustness regarding media selection and coding error. With regard to the second issue of labour and cost intensity, further developments could focus on ways of automating parts of the coding process and on developing better ways of automatically selecting relevant corpuses of media data.

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## Appendix

### 1.CODEBOOK OF PPA VARIABLES

**Table A-1. Identifiers**

Variable name	Description	Values (when applicable)
country	Country name	0: EU 1: Austria 2: France 3: Germany 4: Greece 5: Hungary 6: Italy 7: Sweden 8: UK
episodeid	Name of the episode	1: EU-Turkey 2: Relocation 3: EBCG 4: Hotspots 5: EU-Libya 6: Dublin 11: Bordercontrol_at 12: Balkanroute 13: Asylumlaw_at 14: Integrationlaw_at 15: Righttointervene 21: Ventimiglia_fr 22: Bordercontrol_fr 23: Asylumlaw_fr 24: Rightsofforeigners 25: Calais_fr 31: Wirschaffendas 32: Asylumpackage_de 33: Integrationlaw_de 34: Deportation 35: CDU-CSU 41: Summer of 2015 42: Hotspots-Frontex 44: International Protection Bill 45: Turkey border conflict 51: Fence building 52: Quota referendum 53: Legal border barrier amendment 54: Financial disclosure 55: Stop Soros 61: Mare Nostrum 62: Ventimiglia_it 63: Brenner_it 64: Port closures 65: Sicurezza-bis 71: Bordercontrol_swe 72: Residence permits 73: Police powers 74: Family reunification 75: Municipalities 81: Immigrationact_2014 82: Immigrationact_2015 83: Dubs amendment 84: VPRS 85: Calais 86: Modern Slavery Act
year	Year of news article	
month	Month of news article	

day	Day of news article	
week_num	Week of the year	
modate	Month of the year	
Start	Month of first action	
End	Month of last action	
action_id	Unique episode-specific action identifier arranged in chronological order	
source	Unique Factiva-identifier of source article****	

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\*\*\*\* In case of non-factiva articles, the source is the article title

**Table A-2.Coded variables**

Variable name	Description	Values (when applicable)
arena	Arena or institutional venue where action is taking place	1: media 2: EU/international 3: crossnational/transnational 4: government 5: state 6: elections 7: protest 8: society 9: parliament
actionform	The procedural form of action	1: statement 2: social media 3: press conference 4: interview 5: op-ed 6: report 7: talk-show 8: public speech 9: symbolic appearance 10: working groups 11: telephone/videolink/video-conference 12: meeting 13: letter 14: personnel change 15: other formal institutional action 16: diplomatic channels 17: legal action 18: police 19: military 20: border guards 21: elections 22: referenda signatures 23: vote 24: referenda vote 25: public campaign 26: petition 27: symbolic protest 28: strike 29: demonstration 30: confrontative action 31: violent action 32: catastrophe 33: scandal 34: terrorist attack 35: crime 36: civil society action 37: speech/debate 38: committee 39: hearings 40: other state institutions 41: other societal actions
policyaction	Broad action type in reference to policy proposal	1: policymaking steps 2: policy claims 3: administrative state actions 4: non-state actions

policyaction_specific	Specific action type in reference to policy proposal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1: full support</li> <li>2: conditional support/opposition</li> <li>3: clarification</li> <li>4: apologies</li> <li>5: pledges/commits to further action</li> <li>6: urges further action towards policy</li> <li>7: demands policy change</li> <li>8: rejects demands/criticism</li> <li>9: threats/warnings</li> <li>11: full opposition</li> <li>12: criticises/denigrates opponents</li> <li>13: proposes new policy</li> <li>14: policy concessions</li> <li>15: negotiates</li> <li>16: delays decision-making</li> <li>17: votes on policy</li> <li>18: adopts/decides on policy</li> <li>19: circumvents legal barriers</li> <li>20: vetoes policy</li> <li>21: amends policy</li> <li>22: appeals against policy</li> <li>23: implements policy</li> <li>24: increases implementation resources</li> <li>25: delays implementation</li> <li>26: decreases implementation resources</li> <li>27: fails to implement</li> <li>28: other state action</li> <li>29: helps with implementation</li> <li>30: offers aid beyond implementation</li> <li>31: sabotages</li> <li>32: ceases operations</li> <li>33: formally assesses policy</li> <li>34: other non-state action</li> </ul>
direction	Actor's overall orientation towards policy proposal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1: negative</li> <li>2: neutral</li> <li>3: positive</li> </ul>
actordirection	Actor's overall orientation towards target actor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1: negative</li> <li>2: neutral</li> <li>3: positive</li> </ul>

actor_country	Country or broad geographical background of actor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1: EU</li> <li>2: Belgium</li> <li>3: Bulgaria</li> <li>4: Croatia</li> <li>5: Cyprus</li> <li>6: Czech Republic</li> <li>7: Estonia</li> <li>8: Lithuania</li> <li>9: Luxembourg</li> <li>10: Malta</li> <li>11: Slovakia</li> <li>12: Slovenia</li> <li>13: Denmark</li> <li>14: Finland</li> <li>15: Sweden</li> <li>16: Ireland</li> <li>17: UK</li> <li>18: Austria</li> <li>19: Germany</li> <li>20: France</li> <li>21: Netherlands</li> <li>22: Italy</li> <li>23: Greece</li> <li>24: Portugal</li> <li>25: Spain</li> <li>26: Hungary</li> <li>27: Poland</li> <li>28: Romania</li> <li>29: Latvia</li> <li>30: Switzerland</li> <li>31: Russia</li> <li>32: Turkey</li> <li>33: USA</li> <li>34: China</li> <li>35: Lybia</li> <li>36: Syira</li> <li>37: Egypt</li> <li>38: Non-state actors</li> <li>39: Other country</li> <li>40: Other supranational corssnational multiple countries</li> </ul>
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actor_org	Broad institutional or organisational background of actor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1: EU institutions</li> <li>2: EU parties</li> <li>3: EU as a whole</li> <li>4: National government</li> <li>5: Local/regional authorities</li> <li>6: national parliament</li> <li>7: courts/independent agencies</li> <li>8: state apparatus</li> <li>9: business actors</li> <li>10: experts/media</li> <li>11: civil society</li> <li>12: unions</li> <li>13: churches</li> <li>14: migrations/refugees/individuals</li> <li>15: mainstream opposition</li> <li>16: senior government parties</li> <li>17: junior government parties</li> <li>18: radical left opposition</li> <li>19: radical right opposition</li> <li>20: others</li> <li>21: IMF</li> <li>22: UN</li> <li>23: G7/G20</li> <li>24: World Bank</li> <li>25: Council of Europe</li> <li>26: V4</li> <li>27: NHL</li> <li>28: NATO</li> <li>29: Southern countries</li> <li>30: Franco-German duo</li> <li>31: Balkan route countries</li> <li>32: Other multilateral meetings/multiple countries.</li> </ul>
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actor_specific*	Narrow institutional background of actor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1: EU Commission</li> <li>2: EU Council</li> <li>3: EU Parliament</li> <li>4: ECJ</li> <li>5: EU leaders's summit</li> <li>6: home affairs summit</li> <li>7: defence summit</li> <li>8: foreign affairs summit</li> <li>9: justice ministers' summit</li> <li>10: ECB</li> <li>11: ECHR</li> <li>12: EU Ombudsman</li> <li>13: Frontext/EBCG</li> <li>14: ETUC</li> <li>15: Other EU</li> <li>16: EPP</li> <li>17: EU Socialists</li> <li>18: ALDE</li> <li>19: EU Greens</li> <li>20: ECR</li> <li>21: Identity&amp;Democracy</li> <li>22: GUE/NGL</li> <li>23: Other EU party</li> <li>24: PM/Chancellor/President</li> <li>25: Interior Ministry</li> <li>26: Foreign Affairs Ministry</li> <li>27: Defence ministry</li> <li>28: Ministry of Justice</li> <li>29: Ministry of Migration</li> <li>30: Ministry of Security</li> <li>31: Other ministry</li> <li>32: Ceremonial head of state</li> <li>33: Other government institution</li> <li>34: Army/navy</li> <li>35: Policy</li> <li>36: Coast guard border forces</li> <li>37: Civil Service</li> <li>38: Asylum service</li> <li>39: Other state bureaucracy</li> <li>40: Regional council</li> <li>41: Local council</li> <li>42: other regional/local authority</li> <li>43: Lower House</li> <li>44: Upper House</li> <li>45: Think tanks</li> <li>46: Media/journalists</li> <li>47: Academics/intellectuals</li> <li>48: Other experts</li> <li>49: Amnesty International</li> <li>50: Human Rights Watch</li> <li>51: Medecins Sans Frontiers</li> <li>52: Occupy/Indignados</li> <li>53: Other ngo/smo</li> <li>54: Catholic church</li> <li>55: Orthodox church</li> <li>56: Other church/religious figure</li> <li>57: Migrants/refugees</li> <li>58: Smugglers</li> <li>59: Militias</li> </ul>
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		60: Individuals 61: Supreme Court 62: Lower courts 63: central bank 64: Ombudsman 65: Other independent institution 66: ETUC 67: peak union 68: sectoral union 69: firm level unions 70: other unions 71: other business association 72: other companies 73: chamber of commerce
Actor_role	Position of actor in the narrow institution's hierarchy	1: non-executive 2: sub-executive 3: executive
tactor_country	Country or broad geographical background of targeted actor	1: EU 2: Belgium 3: Bulgaria 4: Croatia 5: Cyprus 6: Czech Republic 7: Estonia 8: Lithuania 9: Luxembourg 10: Malta 11: Slovakia 12: Slovenia 13: Denmark 14: Finland 15: Sweden 16: Ireland 17: UK 18: Austria 19: Germany 20: France 21: Netherlands 22: Italy 23: Greece 24: Portugal 25: Spain 26: Hungary 27: Poland 28: Romania 29: Latvia 30: Switzerland 31: Russia 32: Turkey 33: USA 34: China 35: Lybia 36: Syira 37: Egypt 38: Non-state actors 39: Other country 40: Other supranational corssnational multiple countries

<p>tactor_org</p>	<p>Broad institutional or organisational background of targeted actor</p>	<p>1: EU institutions                  2: EU parties                  3: EU as a whole                  4: National government                  5: Local/regional authorities                  6: national parliament                  7: courts/independent agencies                  8: state apparatus                  9: business actors                  10: experts/media                  11: civil society                  12: unions                  13: churches                  14: migrations/refugees/individuals                  15: mainstram opposition                  16: senior government parties                  17: junior government parties                  18: radical left opposition                  19: radical right opposition                  20: others                  21: IMF                  22: UN                  23: G7/G20                  24: World Bank                  25: Council of Europe                  26: V4                  27: NHL                  28: NATO                  29: Southern countries                  30: Franco-German duo                  31: Balkan route countries                  32: Other multilateral meetings/multiple countries.</p>
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<p>tactor_specific*</p>	<p>Narrow institutional background of targeted actor</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1: EU Commission</li> <li>2: EU Council</li> <li>3: EU Parliament</li> <li>4: ECJ</li> <li>5: EU leaders's summit</li> <li>6: home affairs summit</li> <li>7: defence summit</li> <li>8: foreign affairs summit</li> <li>9: justice ministers' summit</li> <li>10: ECB</li> <li>11: ECHR</li> <li>12: EU Ombudsman</li> <li>13: Frontext/EBCG</li> <li>14: ETUC</li> <li>15: Other EU</li> <li>16: EPP</li> <li>17: EU Socialists</li> <li>18: ALDE</li> <li>19: EU Greens</li> <li>20: ECR</li> <li>21: Identity&amp;Democracy</li> <li>22: GUE/NGL</li> <li>23: Other EU party</li> <li>24: PM/Chancellor/President</li> <li>25: Interior Ministry</li> <li>26: Foreign Affairs Ministry</li> <li>27: Defence ministry</li> <li>28: Ministry of Justice</li> <li>29: Ministry of Migration</li> <li>30: Ministry of Security</li> <li>31: Other ministry</li> <li>32: Ceremonial head of state</li> <li>33: Other government institution</li> <li>34: Army/navy</li> <li>35: Policy</li> <li>36: Coast guard border forces</li> <li>37: Civil Service</li> <li>38: Asylum service</li> <li>39: Other state bureaucracy</li> <li>40: Regional council</li> <li>41: Local council</li> <li>42: other regional/local authority</li> <li>43: Lower House</li> <li>44: Upper House</li> <li>45: Think tanks</li> <li>46: Media/journalists</li> <li>47: Academics/intellectuals</li> <li>48: Other experts</li> <li>49: Amnesty International</li> <li>50: Human Rights Watch</li> <li>51: Medecins Sans Frontiers</li> <li>52: Occupy/Indignados</li> <li>53: Other ngo/smo</li> <li>54: Catholic church</li> <li>55: Orthodox church</li> <li>56: Other church/religious figure</li> <li>57: Migrants/refugees</li> <li>58: Smugglers</li> <li>59: Militias</li> <li>60: Individuals</li> <li>61: Supreme Court</li> <li>62: Lower courts</li> <li>63: central bank</li> <li>64: Ombudsman</li> <li>65: Other independent institution</li> <li>66: ETUC</li> <li>67: peak union</li> <li>68: sectoral union</li> </ol>
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		69: firm level unions 70: other unions 71: other business association 72: other companies 73: chamber of commerce
factor_role	Position of targeted actor in the narrow institution's hierarchy	1: non-executive 2: sub-executive 3: executive
issue1_gen	First general issue area of action's substantive content	1: whole episode 2: migration in general 3: border control 4: asylum 5: returns 6: integration 7: irregular migration 8: legal migration 9: other issues
issue2_gen	Second general issue area of action's substantive content	1: whole episode 2: migration in general 3: border control 4: asylum 5: returns 6: integration 7: irregular migration 8: legal migration 9: other issues
frame1	First normative frame of action	1: security 2: sovereignty 3: geopolitical/strategic 4: identitarian/communitarian 5: humanitarian 6: democracy/rule of law 7: international solidarity 8: domestic solidarity 9: economic-utilitarian 10: efficiency/pragmatic
frame2	Second normative frame of action	1: security 2: sovereignty 3: geopolitical/strategic 4: identitarian/communitarian 5: humanitarian 6: democracy/rule of law 7: international solidarity 8: domestic solidarity 9: economic-utilitarian 10: efficiency/pragmatic

\*name of political parties not labelled, they are indicated under the corresponding string variable

**Table A-3. String variables**

Variable name	Description	Values (when applicable)
Coder	Name of coder	
Action_string	Short summary of action	
i_actor_name	Name of actor (first name last name) or organisation not on the coded list	
t_actor_name	Name of targeted actor (first name last name) or organisation not on the coded list	
frame_string	Specific wording of the frames employed by the actor	

## 2. DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY OF VARIABLES IN THE PPA DATABASE

**Table A-4. Distribution of arena choice in the refugee crisis (frequencies and column percentages)**

Arenas	country								Total
	Austria	France	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Italy	Sweden	UK	
media	403.0	506.0	311.0	524.0	662.0	439.0	292.0	357.0	3494.0
	66.0	50.0	47.6	41.3	55.0	57.2	61.7	57.9	52.9
EU/international	34.0	48.0	22.0	313.0	77.0	43.0	11.0	2.0	550.0
	5.6	4.7	3.4	24.7	6.4	5.6	2.3	0.3	8.3
Cross-national	30.0	25.0	14.0	101.0	34.0	48.0	5.0	14.0	271.0
	4.9	2.5	2.1	8.0	2.8	6.3	1.1	2.3	4.1
government	57.0	88.0	193.0	156.0	54.0	121.0	54.0	42.0	765.0
	9.3	8.7	29.5	12.3	4.5	15.8	11.4	6.8	11.6
state	3.0	103.0	22.0	52.0	46.0	41.0	55.0	9.0	331.0
	0.5	10.2	3.4	4.1	3.8	5.4	11.6	1.5	5.0
elections	12.0	10.0	0.0	3.0	141.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	172.0
	2.0	1.0	0.0	0.2	11.7	0.0	0.0	1.0	2.6
protest	14.0	68.0	11.0	29.0	29.0	48.0	27.0	44.0	270.0
	2.3	6.7	1.7	2.3	2.4	6.3	5.7	7.1	4.1
society	0.0	22.0	6.0	13.0	17.0	7.0	5.0	2.0	72.0
	0.0	2.2	0.9	1.0	1.4	0.9	1.1	0.3	1.1
parliament	58.0	142.0	75.0	78.0	144.0	20.0	24.0	141.0	682.0
	9.5	14.0	11.5	6.2	12.0	2.6	5.1	22.9	10.3
Total	611.0	1012.0	654.0	1269.0	1204.0	767.0	473.0	617.0	6607.0
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

**Table A-5. Distribution of policy action codes among policy claims and policymaking steps (frequencies and column percentages)\***

	Policy-action type	Country								
		Austria	France	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Italy	Sweden	UK	Total
Policy Claims	Full Support	43.0	53.0	41.0	82.0	200.0	43.0	45.0	34.0	541.0
		7.1	6.1	7.0	8.0	18.7	6.3	11.7	5.5	9.2
	Conditional Support/ opposition	137.0	17.0	27.0	59.0	67.0	33.0	26.0	57.0	423.0
		22.6	2.0	4.6	5.7	6.3	4.8	6.7	9.2	7.2
	Clarification	9.0	69.0	34.0	124.0	12.0	44.0	18.0	40.0	350.0
		1.5	7.9	5.8	12.1	1.1	6.4	4.7	6.5	6.0
	Apologies	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	2.0
		0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Pledges/commits	99.0	99.0	11.0	61.0	64.0	40.0	26.0	45.0	445.0
		16.3	11.4	1.9	5.9	6.0	5.8	6.7	7.3	7.6
	Urges further action	73.0	36.0	65.0	129.0	19.0	38.0	14.0	109.0	483.0
		12.0	4.1	11.1	12.6	1.8	5.5	3.6	17.6	8.3
	Demands policy change	31.0	190.0	58.0	99.0	27.0	117.0	22.0	162.0	706.0
		5.1	21.8	9.9	9.6	2.5	17.1	5.7	26.2	12.1
	Rejects demands	16.0	8.0	44.0	41.0	13.0	52.0	15.0	33.0	222.0
		2.6	0.9	7.5	4.0	1.2	7.6	3.9	5.3	3.8
	Threats, warnings	25.0	5.0	20.0	65.0	10.0	81.0	3.0	16.0	225.0
		4.1	0.6	3.4	6.3	0.9	11.8	0.8	2.6	3.8
	Full opposition	84.0	27.0	19.0	38.0	84.0	93.0	54.0	27.0	426.0
		13.8	3.1	3.3	3.7	7.8	13.6	14.0	4.4	7.3
Criticises, denigrates opponents	42.0	136.0	135.0	107.0	466.0	49.0	81.0	13.0	1029.0	
	6.9	15.6	23.1	10.4	43.5	7.1	21.0	2.1	17.6	
Propose new policy	18.0	62.0	28.0	35.0	21.0	9.0	41.0	35.0	249.0	

Policymaking steps		3.0	7.1	4.8	3.4	2.0	1.3	10.6	5.7	4.3
	Policy concession	2.0	0.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.0	5.0	4.0	26.0
		0.3	0.0	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.4	1.3	0.7	0.4
	Negotiates	2.0	61.0	43.0	94.0	26.0	19.0	13.0	3.0	261.0
		0.3	7.0	7.4	9.1	2.4	2.8	3.4	0.5	4.5
	Delays policymaking	2.0	18.0	3.0	5.0	0.0	8.0	0.0	1.0	37.0
		0.3	2.1	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.2	0.6
	Votes on policy	3.0	11.0	6.0	10.0	7.0	1.0	3.0	3.0	44.0
		0.5	1.3	1.0	1.0	0.7	0.2	0.8	0.5	0.8
	Adopt policy	17.0	55.0	34.0	43.0	14.0	27.0	11.0	2.0	203.0
		2.8	6.3	5.8	4.2	1.3	3.9	2.9	0.3	3.5
	Circumvents barriers	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	4.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	8.0
		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1
	Vetoes policy	0.0	1.0	4.0	3.0	0.0	5.0	1.0	0.0	14.0
		0.0	0.1	0.7	0.3	0.0	0.7	0.3	0.0	0.2
	Amends policy	4.0	6.0	8.0	16.0	7.0	12.0	5.0	34.0	92.0
		0.7	0.7	1.4	1.6	0.7	1.8	1.3	5.5	1.6
	Appeals against policy	0.0	18.0	0.0	9.0	27.0	10.0	3.0	0.0	67.0
		0.0	2.1	0.0	0.9	2.5	1.5	0.8	0.0	1.1
	Implements	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Total	607.0	872.0	585.0	1028.0	1072.0	686.0	386.0	618.0	5854.0	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

\*administrative state actions and operational non-state actions are not shown because of their relative paucity in the dataset.



**Table A-6. Distribution of policy-direction and actor-direction codes across the eight countries (frequencies and column percentages)**

		Country								
		Austria	France	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Italy	Sweden	UK	Total
<b>Policy-direction</b>	negative	230.0	293.0	281.0	333.0	415.0	349.0	158.0	173.0	2232.0
		37.6	29.0	43.2	26.2	34.5	45.6	33.4	28.0	33.8
	neutral	35.0	64.0	232.0	227.0	49.0	44.0	92.0	82.0	825.0
		5.7	6.3	35.6	17.9	4.1	5.8	19.5	13.3	12.5
	positive	346.0	653.0	138.0	709.0	740.0	372.0	223.0	364.0	3545.0
		56.6	64.7	21.2	55.9	61.5	48.6	47.2	58.8	53.7
	Total	611	1010	651	1269	1204	765	473	619	6602
		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<b>Actor-direction</b>	negative	101.0	194.0	99.0	377.0	629.0	206.0	170.0	97.0	1873.0
		45.1	70.0	19.5	34.0	73.9	69.1	51.2	37.3	48.6
	neutral	97.0	42.0	342.0	508.0	136.0	39.0	132.0	141.0	1437.0
		43.3	15.2	67.5	45.9	16.0	13.1	39.8	54.2	37.3
	positive	26.0	41.0	66.0	223.0	86.0	53.0	30.0	22.0	547.0
		11.6	14.8	13.0	20.1	10.1	17.8	9.0	8.5	14.2
	Total	224	277	507	1108	851	298	332	260	3857
		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

**Table A-7. Distribution of actor categories across the eight countries (frequencies, column percentages)**

actors	country								Total
	Austria	France	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Italy	Sweden	UK	
EU	20	32	19	215	71	33	10	4	404
	3.3	3.2	2.9	19.9	5.9	4.3	2.1	0.7	6.3
other governments	38	26	22	147	35	70	5	8	351
	6.3	2.6	3.4	13.6	2.9	9.2	1.1	1.3	5.5
other supranational	3	14	1	26	31	16	2	4	97
	0.5	1.4	0.2	2.4	2.6	2.1	0.4	0.7	1.5
national govt	199	266	233	412	376	322	99	197	2104
	32.8	26.4	35.8	38.2	31.4	42.2	21.1	31.9	32.9
local-reg govt	130	82	38	19	50	98	27	9	453
	21.4	8.1	5.8	1.8	4.2	12.8	5.7	1.5	7.1
other nat	12	193	35	54	62	83	80	39	558
	2.0	19.2	5.4	5.0	5.2	10.9	17.0	6.3	8.7
gov party-senior	37	39	132	18	188	4	14	47	479
	6.1	3.9	20.3	1.7	15.7	0.5	3.0	7.6	7.5
gov party-junior	31	1	77	7	28	4	22	7	177
	5.1	0.1	11.8	0.7	2.3	0.5	4.7	1.1	2.8
mainstream opp	30	127	54	86	185	17	83	128	710
	4.9	12.6	8.3	8.0	15.4	2.2	17.7	20.7	11.1
populist opp	35	76	6	7	41	19	24	8	216
	5.8	7.6	0.9	0.7	3.4	2.5	5.1	1.3	3.4
civil society	72	151	34	87	132	97	104	167	844
	11.9	15.0	5.2	8.1	11.0	12.7	22.1	27.0	13.2
Total	607	1007	651	1078	1199	763	470	618	6393
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

**Table A-8. Distribution frames across the eight countries (frequencies, column percentages)**

Frames	Actor types											Total
	EU	foreign govt	supranational	govt	local- regional	State inst	gov party- senior	gov party- junior	mainstream opp	Challenger opp	Civil society	
security	42	63	6	336	56	50	66	20	32	47	41	759
	9.7	11.0	4.8	23.3	16.3	16.6	22.4	18.0	6.2	27.7	5.6	15.0
sovereignty	22	53	6	82	11	10	25	4	13	24	18	268
	5.1	9.3	4.8	5.7	3.2	3.3	8.5	3.6	2.5	14.1	2.5	5.3
geopolitical	19	50	4	47	1	6	1	1	28	2	5	164
	4.4	8.7	3.2	3.3	0.3	2.0	0.3	0.9	5.4	1.2	0.7	3.3
identitarian	32	18	0	60	8	9	32	10	21	15	32	237
	7.4	3.1	0.0	4.2	2.3	3.0	10.9	9.0	4.1	8.8	4.4	4.7
humanitarian	40	57	46	161	60	62	32	21	132	12	317	940
	9.3	10.0	36.5	11.2	17.4	20.5	10.9	18.9	25.5	7.1	43.3	18.6
democracy	76	60	31	113	48	55	34	14	99	14	140	684
	17.6	10.5	24.6	7.8	14.0	18.2	11.5	12.6	19.1	8.2	19.1	13.6
intl solidarity	106	155	19	198	7	11	13	6	28	3	21	567
	24.6	27.1	15.1	13.7	2.0	3.6	4.4	5.4	5.4	1.8	2.9	11.2
dom solidarity	0	2	0	53	47	8	5	5	14	5	13	152
	0.0	0.4	0.0	3.7	13.7	2.7	1.7	4.5	2.7	2.9	1.8	3.0
economic	19	16	0	87	29	13	20	9	19	8	51	271
	4.4	2.8	0.0	6.0	8.4	4.3	6.8	8.1	3.7	4.7	7.0	5.4
efficiency	75	99	14	305	77	78	67	21	132	40	95	1003
	17.4	17.3	11.1	21.2	22.4	25.8	22.7	18.9	25.5	23.5	13.0	19.9
Total	431	573	126	1442	344	302	295	111	518	170	733	5045
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

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