Introduction

In 2014 the surge of Eurosceptic parties at the EP elections triggered a deep political crisis of the EU. In one important member state, the UK, anti-EU attitudes rapidly escalated and eventually led to exit from the Union. In 2016 the then President of the Commission Juncker drummed the outburst of an “existential crisis”, an alarming predicament combining severe functional threats, deep conflicts among the member states, policy stalemate, and explicit political challenges to the very legitimacy and territorial integrity of the Union (Juncker, 2016). Almost a decade has passed: what does the June 2024 ballot have in store for the stability of the EU? The polls indicate further surge of the radical and/or sovereigntist right (Cunningham et al, 2024; Europe Elects, 2024; Rosa and Pöttering, 2024). A result that would destabilize again traditional partisan and inter-institutional equilibria and weaken the support to EU authority at a time when serious challenges and difficult choices loom large, such as strengthening collective defence, implementing the Green Deal, boosting strategic autonomy, and responding to the cost-of-living predicament. The risk is not only related to the internal dynamics of the EU legislative process, but also to the indirect domestic repercussions of the vote: as in 2014, significant perturbations of inter-party relations and an increase of “constraining dissensus” within public opinion on key EU policy issues. While the parallel between 2014 and 1024 is not ungrounded, the risk of a new existential crisis should be assessed against the different backgrounds of the two elections. During the last decade, the institutional structure of the EU has changed, new shocks and challenges were overcome, lessons have been learned. To some extent, even Eurosceptic parties have revised their platforms, their very stance vis-à-vis the EU as such. It may well be the case that the EU has gained more resilience, a greater aptness in weathering the impact of electoral swings and severe endogenous or exogenous shocks. The question then arises: how can we establish whether the EU has in fact improved its own endurance capacity? This Policy Brief will address such a question. I will first characterize the nature of the EU as a polity and spell out my argument about its increased resilience after the polycrisis. Then I will illustrate the argument with the help of three brief case studies regarding Brexit, the Covid emergency and the post/pandemic recovery challenge. The last two sections will summarise my diagnosis and highlight the critical significance of the forthcoming EP elections.